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1. This is a Weinberger v. Salfi hold which has previously 
been remanded for reconsideration in light of Jimenez v. Weinberger, 
417 u.s. 628 {1974). Appellant seeks relief from the provisions of 
the Social Security Act which require that he have received support 
from his deceased father. Had appellant lived with his father, 
were he his father's legitimate child, or were he an illegitimate 
: 
-2-
child meeting a variety of qualifications, he would not be 
required to show receipt of support. 
2. FACTS: Appellant was born in 1964 to unmarried teenage 
parents. His father acknowledged responsibility, and at birth 
contributed $6 and some baby habiliments, but never provided ~ 
~ 
support. The father entered the Army shortly thereafter, and 
did seek to take out an allotment in appellant's behalf. However, 
the procedure was incomplete at the time of his death in Vietnam. 
Appellant then applied for child's insurance benefits, under 
42 u.s.c. § 402{d); the application was pursued to the exhaustion 
of administrative remedies. He thereupon filed suit under 42 
u.s. c. § 40 5 (g) • 
Because he sought to enjoin, on constitutional grounds, the 
operation of the provisions of the Act which disqualified hjm, 
appellant requested a three-judge district court. The single 
district judge (Blair) obliged, but only after first resolving, 
adversely, appellant's nonconstitutional claim that he had 
been sufficiently supported by his father to meet the statute's 
dependency requirements. Appellant relied chiefly on his 
father's efforts to take out an allotment; the court concluded 
that the statute plainly required actual support, not intended 
support. See § 402 (d) (3) (appended to this memo). 
The three-judge court (Winter, Murray, Blair) thought it 
uncertain that the single judge had had jurisdiction over the 
-3-
nonconstitutional claim, since the case required three judges; 
it did not reach the issue, however, because it concluded that 
the single judge had properly disposed of that claim. The 
court went on to certify the case as a class action, and then 
turned to the constitutional issue. The latter requires a 
preliminary description of the relevant statutory provisions. 
Section 40 2 (d) provides for benefits for a "dependent" 
"child'y f a deceased or disabled wage earner. Section 402 ~ · ~ 
•(d) (3) (appended at the end of this memo) deems a child to 
be dependent upon_E is fathe~f he is a legitimate or adopted~ 
child ~f he was living with his father, o: if he is a "child" 
y 
by virtue of §§ 416 (h) (2) (B) or 416 (h) (3). The latter two 
sections provide for certain exceptions to the general 
requirement that status as a "child" be determined by applica-
tion of state law governing devolution of intestate property 
(which excludes illegitimates in many states); the exceptions 
are fo~ose persons who are illegitimate only because of 
defective ceremonial marriages, o~o have been acknowledged 
in writing, or who have been the beneficiaries of court 
paternity or support decrees. Because petr was in none of 
these categories, he could not be deemed eligible save b~ a 
-------;----- '- --- -
!_/Section 402(d) (3) also deems a ~hild to be dependent jf he was 
receiving support from the wage earner at the time of death; as 
has already been noted, appellant failed to establish that he had 
been. (cont.) 
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showing of receipt of support -- a showing which the Secretary 
and lower courts found him to have failed to make. 
The court rejected appellant's contention that the statutory 
classifications should be subjected to strict scrutiny, but did 
conclude that the "new rational basis approach" of Weber v. 
-·on the Jimenez remand, the majority and dissent engaged 
in a lengthy and complex discussion of whether a child was 
also deemed dependent if it was a "child" by virtue of § 416 
(h) (2) (A), which provides for determination of that status by 
application of state intestacy laws. See D. ct. opn, at 11-16, 
dissenting opinion, at n. 1. The majority relied on the plain 
wording of§ 402{d) (3), while the dissent relied principally 
on language in Jimenez, 417 u.s., at 634. That case does 
indicate that both the Secretary and the Court assumed that 
an illegitimate entitled to inherit is deemed dependent by 
virtue of § 416 (h) (2) (A). The issue was not essential to \ 
Jimenez, however, and § 416 (h) ( 2) (A) on its face does nothing 
more than establish that such a person is a "child." Section 
402 (d) (3) deems to be "dependent" a person who is a "child" 
by operation of certain specific sections, not including 
§ 416 (h) (2) (A). 
The relevance of this issue turns on the lack of rational 
relationship between state devolution laws and the likelihood 
of an illegitimate's having been dependent on his father. 
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Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), was appropriate. This 
approach was thought to be that of determining statutory purpose, 
and then judging whether the challenged classification rationally 
served that purpose. The court also thought, however, that 
social welfare legislation could not be surgically precise, so 
that some incidental discrimination was permissible. As for 
the Social Security Act, the court stated that it was based on 
the dual concepts of parentage and dependency, and that the 
dependency involved was actual dependency, not potential. The 
court considered it reasonable for the statute to presume 
dependency for legitimate children, for any child living with a 
father, and for illegitimates who had obtained judicial decrees -
of paternity or support. The presumption of dependency for 
those who had been acknowledged in writing was somewhat more 
difficult, but the court thought it reasonable to presume that 
men are more likely to provide support when they have been 
willing to accept responsibility in writing. Unlike Labine v. 
Vincent, 401 u.s. 532 (1971), the statute did not erect an 
impenetrable barrier against illegitimates -- they had full 
...... 
opportunity to show the critical element of dependency. 
Moreover, the statute really didn't treat equal dependents 
unequally, cf., Weber, since all could establish dependency; 
rather, it merely established simplified formalistic methods of 
proof for reasonably chosen classes of children. Appellant's 
: 
-6-
problem was seen ~s basically that of being outside the class of 
persons for whom the Act was designed, to wit, those who received 
actual support from a wage earner. 
This Court vacated and remanded in light of Jimenez v. ~ 
of Weinberger, in which was ruled unconstitutional a provision 
the Act which barred benefits to illegitimate children born 
after the onset of their wage earner parent's disability. The -
majority of the district court conc~uded that Jimenez had no 
effect on its earlier decision. Its basic point of distinction 
was that in Jimenez a particular subclass of illegitimates was 
prohibited from even showing dependency, despite the Act's 
basic purpose of providing support for dependents, whereas here -
appellant is not barred from making such a showing. It noted 
-...__...... ~ ~ '-wa 
that Jimenez had not established illegitimacy as a suspect 
classification, nor had it cast doubt on the court's under-
standing of the purpose of the Social Security Act. Moreover, 
the restriction here does not make the statute underinclusive --
while it permits benefits for nondependent children falling in 
various categories, it does not exclude any child who in fact 
was dependent. 
Judge Winter, dissenting, acknowledged that Jimenez dealt 
with different restrictions, but thought the case "gave strong 
and clear indications" that the dependency requirement was also 
invalid. His principal argument was that various references 
-7-
in the opinion supported appellant's contention that the purpose 
Of the Act We e t 1 t 1 t . 1 ~ . r o rep ace ac ua or poten 1a support. Th1s 
being the purpose, proof of paternity alone was sufficient, and 
a further showing of support could not be rationally or validly 
required of subclasses of illegitimates. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellant contends that the purpose of 
the Act is to replace actual or potential support, and that the 
requirement that an illegitimate who establishes paternity must 
also show actual support is thus irrational and arbitrary. He 
also contends that there is no rational or legitimate basis for 
discriminating against illegitimate children (especially since 
almost as many absent fathers of legitimate children fail to 
support their children as do absent fathers of illegitimate 
children), and that the case is analogous to Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 u.s. 677 (1973) (which struck down a requirement 
that dependency on female military personnel be established) • 
He contends that illegitimacy should be viewed as a suspect 
classification, since illegitimates have been "relegated to 
such a position of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." 
San Antonio Indep. School Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
~He relied, for example, on the Court's citation to a House-Senate 
conference Report; there is language in that report, not quoted in 
Jimenez, which speaks of the purpose of the Act in terms of replacjng 
obligations of support. Judge Winter also focused on the fact that 
/ 
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He also preserves - his factual claim that he made an adequate 
showing of receipt of support from his father. 
4. DISCUSSION: The case is a hold for Salfi, both on the 
merits and jurisdictionally. The jurisdictional issues affect 
the propriety of class-wide relief and, more importantly, this 
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Note 8 of Justice Rehnquist's 
draft opinion in Salfi leaves open the issue of whether a 
§ 405(g) court can grant injunctive relief. If the jurisdictional 
portion of the draft is adopted, the present appeal forces that 
issue-- if§ 405(g) does not authorize injunctive relief, the 
three-judge court was improperly convened and the requirements 
for § 1253 appeals are not met (unlike Salfi, § 1252 jurisdiction 
is also lacking, since the decision below was in favor of the 
statute's validity). 
The arguments based on the intent of the Social Security 
Act strike me as exceedingly s~range. They would strike down -
the support requirement because of its perceived inconsistency 
with an overall statutory purpose which has been divined in 
total disregard of the challenged section which section 
makes abundantly clear Congress' interest in focusing on actual 
the applicant in Jimenez was precluded from benefits because he in 
fact could not show that he had ever been supported by his father 
(since the father was disabled when he was born) -- which is precisely 
the problem which appellant faces. 
-9-
support. To my mind, the only appropriate frame of analysis 
looks strictly to whether Congress had a rational basis for 
presuming wage earner support as to all classes of children, 
legitimate and illegitimate, save for that to which appellant 
belongs (unless, of course, the Court treats illegitimacy as 
a suspect criterion) • 
There is no response. 
6/5/75 Jacobs All opns in petn app. 
42 u.s.c. § 402 {d) {3) 
A child shall be deemed dependent upon his 
father or adopting !ather or his mother or adopting 
mother at the time specified In paragraph 0) < Cl of 
this subsection unless, at such time, such Individual 
was not llving with or contributing to the support of 
such child and-
( A} such child is neither the legitimate nor 
adopted child of such Individual. or 
<Bl such child has been adopted by some other 
individual. 
For purposes of this paragraph, a child deemed to be 
a child of a fully or currently insured Individual 
pursuant to section 416<h) <2l <Bl or section 416<hl 
<3) of this title shall be deemed to be the legitimate 
child of such individual. 
Ul..-/-~ p ':;: ~ f-- Cf-: 
-cf~ '\.1 j;nprtm:t QftnUi cf tqt ~tb j;tzdtg 
'Jlira:g!p:ngron. 16. QJ. zo&r~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 12, 1975 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 74-6212 - Norton v. Weinberger 
r ~have taken the liberty of asking Mike Rodak to relis this case for me at our next Conference, even though t re were five votes to note probable jurisdiction limited to the constitutional question at today's Conference. My 
reason for doing so is that the presently circulating draft 
opinion in Salfi contains a reservation as to the question of 
whether a District Court exercising jurisdiction under§ 205(g) 
of the Social Security Act may issue an injunction. If that 
drculation does become a Court opinion, there will be presented 
on the appeal in Norton the issue as to whether this Court 
has jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1253, since that section 
limits our appellate jurisdiction to an action required to be 
heard by a three-judge court, and 28 u.s.c. § 2282 requires a 
three-judge court only when application is made for an inter-
locutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement 
of • • • "any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitu-
tion of the United States ••• ". This question is presented 
in Norton though not in Salfi because in the latter case we 
have jurisdict1on under 28 u.s.c. § 1252 because the District 
Court there held an Act of Congress unconstitutional. In 
Norton the ruling of the three-judge District Court was in 
favor of constitutionality, and therefore jurisdiction depends 
on 28 u.s.c. § 1253. 
- 2 -
If there is thought to be substance to my view, I think 
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CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
May 15, 1976 
Dear Lewis: 
No. 75-649, Mathews v. Mattern, in December 
marked as a hold for No. 74-204, Mathews v. Eldridg , 
has now come down, and for No. 74-6212, Norton v. Mathews. 
I have written Norton. It is at the Printer, but I propose to 
hold it until the companion case is ready. In any event, I doubt 
very much that Norton will bear on Mattern. 
No. 75-1234, Mathews v. Elliott, at Saturday•s confer-
ence was relisted for May 20. I asked that it be relisted with 
the Mattern case. My thought is that both bear upon your 
Eldridge opinion and that we can get rid of both cases (perhaps 
remand for reconsideration in the light of Eldridge) rather than 
have them drag on for Norton. 
I shall value your comments as to this suggestion. Would 
you be able to do this for next Thursday•s conference? 
Sincerely, 
~~ ----" 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
( 
ilt DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:m 
( No, 74-6212 
Gregory Norton> Jr,,, etc,, 
Appellant, 
v, 
F , David Mathews, Secretary 
of Health, Education, 
a.nd Welfare, 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
t he District of Mary-
land. 
[May -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the 
Court, 
On the merits, this case raises the same question as 
to the constitutionality of §§ 202 (d) (3) and 216 (h)(3) 
(C) (ii) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 402 
(d)(3) and 416 (h)(3)(C)(ii), as was presented in 
Mathews v. Lucas, ante, p. -. The present litigation, 
however, also raises certain jurisdictional issues. It now 
has become apparent that the simultaneous submission 
of Lucas to the Court, and our decision in that case 
today, make It necessary for us specifically to decide the 
jurisdictional questions, 
I 
Appellant Gregory Norton, Jr., was born out of wed-
lock in February 1964. Both his father and his mother 
then were high school students, a.ged, respectively, 16 
and 14, who lived separately at home with their parents. 
The two never married and, indeed, never lived together. 
Appellant always has resided with his maternal grand-
mother and has been cared for by her.. When Gregory 
was born, his father contributed six dollars and some 
clothing and other habiliments for the baby, but, being 
74-6212-0PINION 
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so young and unemployed, he never assumed appellant's 
actual support, 
In February 1965 the father entered military service. 
He was killed in Vietnam on May 19, 1966, at age 19. 
Before his death, the father apparently took some initial 
steps (the procurement of a birth certificate and other 
items) necessary for the processing of a dependent child's 
military allotment. The father failed, however, to com-
plete the required procedures before he was killed. 
In September 1969 appellant's maternal grandmother 
filed on his behalf an application for ~urviving child's 
benefits under § 202 (d) (1) of the Act, 4'2 U. S. C. § 402 
(d) (1), based on the father's earnings record. An ad-
ministrative hearing followed. The Hearing Examiner 
concluded that appellant was not entitled to benefits as 
a dependent child because his father, at the time of his 
death, was neither living with appella.nt nor contribut-
ing to appellant's support.1 App. 13-19.. The subse-
quent administrative appeal was no more successful. 
ld., 20-21, 
1 Section 202 (d) (1) provides survivorship benefits only to a child 
who was "dependent" upon the deceased insured parent at the time 
of the parent's den,th . A legitimn,te child, a child entitled under 
t.he intestacy laws of the insured parent's domicile to inherit per-
sonal property from the parent, a cluld whose illegitimacy results 
from a formal defect in his parents' purported marriage ceremony, 
and a child acknowledged m writing by the insured father as his 
son or daughter or JUdtcially decreed (during the father's lifetime) 
to be such, are all deemed under the Act. to be dependent, and 
thus are relieved of otherwise p110ving actual dependency. Sections 
202 (d) ( 1), 202 (d) (3), 216 (e), 216 (h) (2), and 216 (h) (3) (C), 
42 U. S. C §§ 402 (d) (1), 402 (d) (3), 416 (e), 416 (h) (2), and 
416 (h) (3) (C). Since appellant did not come within any of these 
categories, he could establish his status as a dependent child under 
the Act only by showing that his father lived with him or con-
tributed to his support at the time of his death. Sections 202 
(d)(3) and 216 (h)(3)(C)(ii), 42 U.S. C. §§402 (d)(3) and 416 
(h) (3) (C) (ii) See generally Mathews v. Lucas, wnte, p . -. 
7 4-6212-0PINION 
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The present action was then instituted on behalf of 
appellant against the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare. By the complaint, relief was sought alter-
natively on statutory and constitutional grounds. First, 
it was asserted that, by his attempt to secure a military 
allotment for appellant, the father, at the time of his 
death, in fact was contributing to appellant's support, 
within the meaning of § 216 (h) (3) (C) (ii) of the Act, 
and that appellant therefore was a dependent of the 
father, under §§ 202 (d)(1) and (3), and entitled to 
benefits. Second, it was asserted that, by creating a 
presumption of dependency, and consequent qualifica.tion 
for benefits, for legitimate children generally, and for 
illegitimate children under certain circumstances, seen. 1, 
but denying the presumption to appellant and others 
similarly situated, the Act discriminated against appel-
lant's class, in violation of the guaranty of equal protec-
tion implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Appellant's statutory claim was initially considered and 
rejected by a single district judge. Norton v. R_ichard-
son, 352 F. Supp. 596 (Md. 1972). In view of the com-
plaint's request for certification of a class pursuant to 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c)(1), and for class-wide injunc. 
tive relief against the alleged unconstitutional operation 
of the Act's presumptions of dependency, a three-judge 
court was convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282 and 2284 
to pass upon the constitutional claim. The three-judge 
court first agreed with, and reaffirmed,, the single judge's 
rejection of appellant's statutory claim. Norton v. W ein-
berger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (Md. 1973). The court 
went on to identify the plaintiff class, id., at 1120-1121,2 
but on the merits of the constitutional claim it ruled in 
2 The definition of the class, however, does not appear to have 
b een formalized in the three-judge court's judgment. App. 59. 
7 4-6212-0PINION 
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favor of the Secretary and granted summary judgment 
in his favor. Id., at 1121-1131. 
Appellant, taking the position that the 3-judge court 
had denied his request for an order enjoining enforce-
ment of provisions of the Act, lodged a direct appeal 
here pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253. While his juris-
dictional statement was pending, Jimenez v. Weinberger, 
417 U. S. 628 (1974), was decided. This Court there-
after vacated the 3-judge court's judgment and remanded 
the case for further consideration in the light of Jimenez. 
418 U.S. 902 (1974) . 
On the remand, the same 3-judge court, with one judge 
now dissenting (adhered to its earlier conclusion in favor 
of constitutionality. Norton v. Weinberger, 390 F. Supp. 
1084 (Md. 1975). Appellant has again appealed. We 
postponed the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of 
the case on the merits, 422 U. S. 1054 (1975), and, in 
doing so, cited Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763 n. 
8 (1975), which just then had been decided. Subse-
quently, we set the case for oral argument with Mathew8 
v. Lucas, ante. 423 U. S. 819 (1975). 
II 
The question whether the 3-judge court was properly 
convened upon appellant's demand for injunctive relief 
is relevant, of course, to our appellate jurisdiction. If 
the court was not empowered to enjoin the operation of 
a federal statute, then three judges were not required to 
hear the case under 28 U. S. C. § 2282, and this Court 
has no jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. Accord-
ingly, appellant and the Secretary have debated whether 
the District Court possessed injunctive power under§ 205 
(g) of the Act,3 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), and whether, in 
3 Section 205 (b) reads in pertinent part: 
"Any individual, after any final decision of the Seeretary made 
. 74-6212-0PINION 
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the light of § 205 (h)/ 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h), relief was 
available under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1361," or under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U. S. C. § 701 et seq.6 
after a hearing to which he was a pa.rty, irrespective of the amount 
in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 
action . . . . Such action shall be brought in the district court 
of the United States for the judicial diiitrict in which the plaintiff 
resides . . . . As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a 
certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence 
upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The 
court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript 
of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the 
decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for 
a rehearing." 
4 Section 205 (h) rrads in pertinent part: 
"The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall 
be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. 
No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed 
by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein 
provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or 
any officer or employer thereof shall be brought under [§ 1331 and 
other specified sections] of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising 
under this subchapter" [subchapter II of the Social Security Act] . 
See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. 8. 749, 756 n. 3 (1975) . 
5 The initiating judge observed that jurisdiction for his court was 
asserted under the general federal question provision of 28 U. S. C. 
§1331, and under 28 U. S. C. §1361, vesting the district courts 
with junsdiction "in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer 
or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform 
a duty owed to the plamtiff." Norton v. Richardson, 352 F . Supp. 
fi96, 598 II. 2 (Md. 19'72) . 
6 The SoliCitor General contends that the District Court has juris-
diction to review a social security ruling only under § 205 (g) be-
cause § 205 (h) specifically excludes any other source of review of 
such dPterminntions. He then contends that, for two reasons, there 
was no JUrisdiction here to issue an injunction under § 205 (g). 
F1rst, § 205 (g) m terms specifies that a district court rna¥ enter a 
judgment only "affirming, modifymg, or reversing the decision of 
the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing," 
7 4-6212-0PINION 
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We think it unnecessary, however, to resolve the de-
tails of these [ difficult and perhaps close) jurisdictional 
arguments. The substantive questions raised on this ap-
peal now have been determined in Matthews v. Lucas, 
ante.7 This disposition renders the merits in the present 
case a decided issue and thus one no longer substantial 
in the jurisdictional sense. 
Assuming that the 3-judge court was correctly con-
vened, and that we have jurisdiction over the appeal, the 
appropriate disposition in the light of Mathews v. Lucas, 
plainly would be to affirm the judgment entered in this 
case in favor of the Secretary. Assuming, on the other 
hand, that we lack jurisdiction because the 3-judge court 
was needlessly convened, the appropriate disposition 
would be to dismiss the appeal. When an appeal to 
but does not sa,y it ma,y enjoin him, and, moreover, in this statu-
tory structure an injunction is out of place. Second, although the 
suit was made to sound as a class action, the class was not properly 
certified, inasmuch .as there was no allegation that the members had 
· even filed applications for benefits; thus there is no jurisdiction over 
the cla,ss aspects of the case. Weinberger v. Sdlfi, 422 U. S. 749 
(1975), is cited. Smce only the individual claim remains, even if 
injunctive power were available under § 405 (g), it would not be 
appropriately exercised in review of a single claimant's case. 
The appellant contends in rebuttal that the "affirming, modifying, 
or reversing" language in § 205 (g) does not withdraw a district 
court 's general and inherent eqmty powers, including the power to 
enjoin, and that, in any event, jurisdiction remains under the other-
cited statutes. 
7 The respective jurisdictional statements for the original appeal 
and for the present one preserved appellant's statutory claim along 
with his constitutional contention. The statutory claim, however, 
was not pressed in appellant's brief in the present case, and at oral 
argument is explicitly was abandoned. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6. 
We note, too, that, in contrast to the situation in Weinberger v. 
Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763 n. 8 (1975), there is no jurisdiction here 
nnder 28 U. S. C. § 1252 smce the District Court's decision was in 
favor of the statute's constitutionality. 
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this Court is sought from an erroneously convened 3-
judge District Court, we retain the P<>wer "'to make 
such eorrective order as may be appropriate to the en-
forcement of the limitations' " which 28 U. S. C. § 1253 
imposes. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 34 (1962), 
quoting Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S. 
16, 18 (1934). What we have dooe recently, and in most 
such cases where the j urisdidional i~Mue was previously 
unsettled-and we do not imply that our doing so is 
statutorily or otherwise compelled-has been 'k> vaeate 
the District Court jud~rnent and remand the case for 
the entry of a fresh decree from which an appeal may bey~"" 
taken to the appropriate eourt of appeals. Gonzales v. 
Employee• Credit Union, 419 U. S. 00, 101 (1914), is 
an example. In the present cue, however, the deeision 
in ~ bas rendemd the ootl8titutional Wmet!l insub-
stantial ud !0 much so u not even to support the juri&-o 
dietion of a 3-ju• District Court to oonsider their 
mel'it's on remand. See, e. g., Hid'& v. Miramla, 422 
U. S. 382, ~ (1975); HogtJm v. Lavine, 415 U. 8. 
528, 586-338 (1974). Thus, there ia no point in remand· 
in1 to enable the merits to be considered by a eourt of 
appeals. See Mc:Lttros v. DeChamplain, <&2'1 U. S. 21 
(1975).8 
3 ln McLU(-118 a single district judge enjoined the enforcement ·of 
Art. 134 of the Unifuftn Code of Military Ju.stiee, )0 U.S. C. § 934, 
without convening s 3·iudge eottrt. He did so because he considered 
the oonstitutional infirmity o-f the Article to be plain. See Bailey v. 
Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962}. On direct apPffil, under 28 U. 8. C. 
§1252, the propriety of pl'lnedint; without a 3-)ttdge court was 
questiolled. We observed that if a 3-judge court was ori~mally re-
Qllired 1111lder 28 U.S. C.§ 2282, we ordinarily were bound to vaeate 
the judgmeat and remand for the convenilll of a 3-judge court. 
Flemming v. Neltor, 363 U. S. 603, 607 (1960); Federul Houing 
Admi~tration v. f'Ae DuTlingtOft, Inc., 3&2 tJ. S. 97? ~195n, ~n· 
eluding, howe\W, that no pufPO!le could 'be sewed by decidillJ 
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It thus is evident that, whichever disposition we under-
take, the effect is the same. It follows that there is no 
need to decide the theoretical question of jurisdicti~ in 
this case. In the past, we similarly have reserved diffi-
cultlluestions of our jurisdiction when the case a ter-
natlv'~ly could be resolved on the merits in favor of the 
same party. See &cretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 
U. S. 676 (1974). The Court has done this even when 
the original reason for granting certiorari was to resolve 
the jurisdictional issue. See United States v. Augen-
blick, 393 U. S. 348, 349-352 (1969). Although such 
a disposition would not be desirable under all circum-
stances, we perceive no reason why we may not so pro-
ceed in this case where the merits have been rendered 
plainly insubstantial. Cf. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 
421 U. S., at 32. Making the asumption, then, without 
deciding, that our jurisdiction in this cause is estab-
lished, we aft'rm· the judgment in favor of the Secretary 
~n the basis of our decision in Mathews v. Lucas, ante. 
It is so ordered. 
whether a 3-judge court was required origimily, because intervening 
decisions of this Court sustaining the constitutionality of Art. 134 
had rendered the merits issue plainly insubstantial by the time the 
case was before us, we vacated the judgment and remanded the 
case, directing dismissal. 421 U. S., at 32. 







.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u:vrtmt <!fcurt cf tqt ~ttitth ~tatts 
'~lhtsqi:nghtu. !f}. <!f. 2ll,?J!.~ 
June 7, 1976 
Re: No. 74-6212, Norton v. Mathews 
Dear Harry, 
My Conference notes indicate that a 
majority voted to dismiss this appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction. Accordingly, ;I shall await a 
further expression of views on that subject. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
;§u:prttnt <!Jomt ttf tlrt ~ta ;§tatts 
jiasfting~ ~. <!f. 2llbi~' 
June 11, 1976 
Re: No. 74-6212 - Norton v. Mathews 
Dear Harry: 
My recollection of the Conference vote in this case 
is, like Potter's, that there was a majority to dismiss 
/ 
for want of jurisdiction. If there is no longer a majority 
which feels that the opinion should be written that way, 
I will of course join you. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Blackrnun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.:§u:vrtmt \!fcurt cf tqt ~nittlt .;§tates 
Jl~:ts!ringhttt. ~. \!f. 20~){.~ 
June 14, 1976 
Re: No. 74-6212 - Norton v. Mathews 
Dear Harry: 
Please state at the foot of your opinion 
in this case that I join the opinion of the Court 
with the reservations stated in my concurring 
statement in No. 75-88, Mathews v. Lucas. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS O F 
..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.iUVt"tntt (!Jcurt cf Urt ~tritt~ ,jtatts 
Jfasfri:ttghm. ~. <!f. 2ll&fJ!.~ 
June 22, 1976 
Re: No. 74-6212, Norton v. Mathews 
Dear Harry, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
,jnprttttt <!Jltttrlof tift '~Uritta ~fattg 
.. asfri:ttg~ ~. <!J. 2.0~~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
June 22, 1976 
Re: No. 74-6212 - Norton v. Mathews 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
j)n;rrnttt <!Jonrl of Hr~ ~~ ~taftg 
~u£ri:n:ghtn. ~. <!J. 2ll~'l>~ 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE June 25, 1976 
Re: 74-6212 -Norton v. Mathews 
Dear Harry: 
I join your June 1 proposed opinion. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS O F 
JU S TICEWM. J . BRE NNAN, JR . 
.§u:pnmt <!Jou:rt of tJrt ~nitc~ .§tatte 
~agJrington. tB. <!J. 206fJ!.~ 
June 28, 1976 
RE: No. 74-6212 Norton v.Mathews 
Dear John: 
Please join me in your diss enting opinion in the 
above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
J USTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~u:pumt <!}curt of tlrt 1Jlttittb ~tatts 
~atlfringtcn. 18. <!}. 20.;tJ!.;t 
June 28, 1976 
Re: No. 74-6212 - Norton v. Mathews 
No. 75-88 - Mathews v. Lucas 
Dear Harry: 
If I have not before made it clear, I join 
your opinions in these cases and withdraw any 
concurring opinions or statements previously cir-
culated. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to Conference 
' I 
,®u:pumt <!Jond of tlp~ 1futtttb .§taftg 
'llJasltingfon, gl. \!}. :We?'~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 28, 197 6 
Re: No. 74-6212. Norton v. Mathews 
Dear John: 




Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
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